# tactiq.io free youtube transcript
# The False Claims Act and The DOJ's Civil Cyber Fraud Initiative with Julie Bracker
# https://www.youtube.com/watch/Zf5r5QO7ENg

00:00:00.170 [Music]
00:00:05.120 hello hello it's Jacob Hill with GRC
00:00:07.000 Academy today I'm here with Miss Julie
00:00:09.320 bracker Julie how are you today I'm
00:00:12.040 great thank you so much good good thank
00:00:14.200 you so much for coming on and and folks
00:00:16.160 as always if you're enjoying the podcast
00:00:17.960 please take a moment to like comment
00:00:19.560 share subscribe review all the things
00:00:21.960 really helps me out thanks in advance
00:00:24.080 Julie tell us about your background and
00:00:26.359 how you got to where you are today I
00:00:28.000 could go on and on I'll I'll be brief
00:00:30.240 I've turned myself into a onetick pony
00:00:32.238 at this point I have been doing Federal
00:00:34.120 fault claims act litigation and pretty
00:00:36.320 much only that with a with a side order
00:00:39.040 of some other whistleblower laws but
00:00:40.800 basically Federal faal claims act worked
00:00:42.600 since 2006 my partner Jason Marcus and I
00:00:45.559 started our firm in 2015 and we've been
00:00:49.039 turning out false claims at cases since
00:00:51.079 then awesome awesome well let's Dive
00:00:53.559 Right In then talk to us about what is
00:00:55.760 the false claims act and what are the
00:00:57.440 origins of it cuz I think that's pretty
00:00:59.120 fascinating in itself so I'm going to
00:01:01.000 express opinions that are my own and
00:01:03.120 they are not legal opinions they are not
00:01:04.680 legal advice they are strictly me
00:01:06.960 chatting with my pal Jak about how
00:01:08.960 things look in this very interesting and
00:01:11.640 very developing area of law so take it
00:01:14.400 all with the grain of conversational
00:01:16.280 salt and enjoy uh what you can glean
00:01:19.200 from it but please don't take it as as
00:01:20.880 any sort of advice that's pretty risky
00:01:22.680 question talk about the false claims act
00:01:24.720 one trick pony I can do that for could
00:01:27.159 have a whole extra episode but it is an
00:01:29.400 interesting statute the federal fault
00:01:31.040 claims act it's called Lincoln's law it
00:01:32.880 was actually passed during a Civil War
00:01:34.439 era and its purpose was we had some
00:01:37.240 folks who were taking tremendous
00:01:39.399 advantage of the federal government
00:01:40.759 during war times and they would send
00:01:42.920 flour but it had weevils in it
00:01:44.640 supposedly they would order horses for
00:01:46.240 the troops the troops would get the
00:01:47.960 horses and they would be nearly dead
00:01:50.079 they you know starved they sent uniforms
00:01:52.520 that were made of tissue instead of
00:01:54.520 cloth just some terrible things that
00:01:56.479 were happening and some of that there's
00:01:58.240 modern versions of that that happen
00:01:59.600 today that the false claims act can be
00:02:01.479 aimed at as well the idea was it's very
00:02:04.439 difficult to figure out who's
00:02:05.759 responsible for this and get our money
00:02:07.360 back it's a very powerful law it is for
00:02:10.000 the purpose of catching people who are
00:02:11.360 defrauding the government and so the way
00:02:13.400 that the statute is set up if you steal
00:02:15.879 from the government then the government
00:02:17.599 recovers treble damages three times the
00:02:20.040 damages and you pay for the attorney's
00:02:23.360 fees the really weird part about the FCA
00:02:26.160 and this is pretty much the only place
00:02:27.920 in American jur Prudence where they
00:02:29.360 still exist
00:02:30.400 is a hold over from England called the
00:02:32.160 quam provision so the quam provision is
00:02:34.760 a very long Latin phrase that the first
00:02:37.120 two words of which are quam and it's
00:02:39.080 Latin so it's qu not key like quid
00:02:41.360 proquote the quam provision says that if
00:02:44.239 you a citizen know of a fraud being
00:02:47.280 perpetrated against the government then
00:02:49.519 you can report it you can relate to the
00:02:51.840 government what has happened and you
00:02:53.080 become a relator when you relate what's
00:02:55.319 happened and they recover then you can
00:02:58.080 receive up to 30% of what they recover
00:03:00.560 which you think about it is nicely
00:03:02.040 balanced they're going to get treble
00:03:03.200 damages the relator can get up to a
00:03:05.080 third of that and that and the
00:03:07.000 government is still keeping double
00:03:08.239 damages so couple of things about that
00:03:11.360 you can't bring that action on your own
00:03:12.959 you need an attorney that you can't
00:03:14.920 because you're standing in the shoes of
00:03:17.120 the federal government and saying this
00:03:19.560 this is what has happened to the
00:03:20.720 government and the process for doing
00:03:22.640 that is also really weird even lawyers
00:03:25.840 who've practiced this is a very peculiar
00:03:28.200 little weird area of the law the process
00:03:30.400 would be say you knew about a fraud
00:03:32.400 being perpetrated against the United
00:03:34.159 States for federal so basically
00:03:36.000 someone's lying to get money from the
00:03:38.120 government that they're not entitled to
00:03:39.959 or someone is lying to keep money that
00:03:42.000 they're not entitled to so that happens
00:03:43.680 both ways it's called a rumor false
00:03:45.200 claim basically all the same thing in
00:03:47.519 the Reagan Era there was a lot of
00:03:49.760 complaints about the defense industry
00:03:51.640 robbing the United States with their
00:03:53.760 very expensive $77,000 uh Hammers and so
00:03:56.760 forth the FCA made an reappearance and
00:03:59.879 late 1980s there were amendments
00:04:02.000 Congress put through to take away what
00:04:04.000 was then called a government dis
00:04:05.720 government knowledge bar which is the
00:04:08.439 idea that if the government already
00:04:10.120 knows about a fraud you're not telling
00:04:11.560 them anything it doesn't know already so
00:04:13.239 you can't recover anything as a relator
00:04:15.760 well you know the government is not like
00:04:17.519 one person the not like saying well
00:04:20.199 Jacob knew it's like saying did someone
00:04:22.960 in government know this and that kept
00:04:25.600 the government from paying out any
00:04:26.919 whistleblower rewards which prevented
00:04:28.759 anybody from coming forward because who
00:04:31.000 wants to risk their career their life
00:04:33.400 literally their life in some instances
00:04:35.639 to report these things who's willing to
00:04:37.560 do that when there's no chance of any
00:04:39.600 recovery whatsoever you know it's a very
00:04:41.120 important part of the program that
00:04:43.400 attorneys need get paid and that The
00:04:44.759 Whistleblower is incentivise after the
00:04:46.960 Amendments they were certainly used in
00:04:48.800 the defense industry but then some of my
00:04:50.720 colleagues looked around and said you
00:04:52.120 know what it's also a contract with the
00:04:53.680 federal government Medicare Medicaid all
00:04:56.600 of these Healthcare and now I would say
00:04:58.240 Healthcare is probably close to 85% of
00:05:01.600 false claims that cases that are brought
00:05:03.360 CMS has gotten very good at the
00:05:05.440 mechanics of dealing with the sca which
00:05:07.680 I guess I should back up and tell you
00:05:08.919 about a little bit if you come to me and
00:05:10.759 say hey my employer is miscoding you
00:05:13.199 know every time my doctor sees a patient
00:05:15.960 he says it's a level five visit and it's
00:05:18.680 actually you know not true that it's
00:05:20.479 always a level five visit some of them
00:05:22.360 are one statistically improbable that
00:05:24.199 they're all going to be fives but maybe
00:05:25.800 what you know is that he's told you I
00:05:27.360 don't care how long I see the patient
00:05:28.880 coded as a five
00:05:30.280 and you're worried because you're being
00:05:32.120 asked to put into the Billing System
00:05:34.039 something that's not true and you're
00:05:35.560 afraid Hey I what if it comes back on me
00:05:37.880 and he blames me this is fraud you know
00:05:40.120 what do I do so you call me or one of my
00:05:42.319 colleagues and hopefully someone who
00:05:44.639 knows how the FCA works that's really
00:05:47.440 important and we package up the
00:05:50.160 information we make sure that yes indeed
00:05:52.800 that does sound like a violation of the
00:05:55.000 FCA because there are rules and
00:05:57.240 regulations around Medicare particularly
00:05:59.039 you know very complex so we sort of Kick
00:06:01.759 the tires on what you think is wrong
00:06:03.160 make sure we agree that that's
00:06:04.360 fraudulent put together all the
00:06:06.000 information in the way that the
00:06:07.199 government can best conest it and then
00:06:09.520 we file a case under seal under seal
00:06:12.599 sounds very exciting right but what it
00:06:14.960 really means is that the only people who
00:06:16.440 know about that case are the government
00:06:19.440 that we serve the complaint on remember
00:06:21.520 they're really the plaintiff we're just
00:06:22.919 standing in their shoes and relating to
00:06:24.759 them what happened so the government
00:06:26.520 knows the relator knows and the court
00:06:28.280 knows but the defendants know which
00:06:30.400 normally in a lawsuit after you file the
00:06:32.400 complaint you've got a a short period of
00:06:34.800 time where you need to go and serve the
00:06:36.800 complaint on the defendant there's no
00:06:38.520 service under the FCA until after the
00:06:40.360 seal period expires by Statute that's 60
00:06:43.680 days in real life it takes 60 days for
00:06:46.360 the government to REM realize it has a
00:06:48.440 case and needs to put people stashing it
00:06:51.400 right yeah so the first thing that
00:06:53.680 happens typically is the government will
00:06:56.039 move for an extension of the seal and
00:06:58.440 those are usually done in
00:07:00.080 some districts some judges will allow
00:07:02.080 them to go ahead and take a year at the
00:07:03.400 very beginning because realistically
00:07:05.319 we're looking at a two to threee seal
00:07:07.000 period on a pretty fast case it's just a
00:07:10.440 complicated process because the the
00:07:12.479 government will assemble its team the
00:07:14.319 government will interview the relator so
00:07:16.199 they can hear from the relator directly
00:07:17.800 what I have packaged in this written
00:07:19.919 format and then the investigation will
00:07:21.919 begin that may include a civil
00:07:23.960 investigative demand which is like a
00:07:25.319 government subpoena where they're
00:07:26.599 getting documents it may include talking
00:07:29.280 with Witnesses usually they'll start
00:07:30.919 with the former employees you know they
00:07:32.960 want to see if other people substantiate
00:07:34.919 what the relator is saying and
00:07:36.560 eventually if everything checks out
00:07:39.080 they'll get to the point where they may
00:07:40.680 ask for what's called a partial lift of
00:07:42.440 The Shield which means the the defendant
00:07:44.800 is brought into the seal and now you
00:07:46.879 know during that time the the defendant
00:07:48.479 may be responding to cids or giving
00:07:52.080 testimony they may even be deposing some
00:07:54.879 of the people at the company and they
00:07:56.599 may not know they likely don't know they
00:07:59.039 know they're investigation but an FCA
00:08:01.440 case can even be brought by the
00:08:03.120 government itself it doesn't have to be
00:08:04.599 under the quam statute so they don't
00:08:06.560 know if they're dealing with a
00:08:07.400 whistleblower just a government
00:08:08.960 investigation maybe just an agency
00:08:10.919 investigation they really are not sure
00:08:13.000 until that partial lift at that point
00:08:14.840 they're usually told sometimes they're
00:08:16.440 given a copy of the complaint sometimes
00:08:18.360 they're given a redacted copy of the
00:08:20.000 complaint where we take off The
00:08:21.000 Whistleblower name and information
00:08:22.919 although in in a lot of settings I'd say
00:08:25.479 most of the time they're going to have a
00:08:26.919 pretty good idea who the whist was
00:08:28.440 because they've raised the issue
00:08:29.520 internally before they ever came out
00:08:31.800 sometimes they've left that employment
00:08:33.039 I've had whistleblowers who were with
00:08:35.080 their defendant employer the whole time
00:08:37.279 for the lawsuit wow uh it can it can go
00:08:39.559 a lot of directions so I think I've over
00:08:41.880 anwered that question but that's the FCA
00:08:44.080 that's what it is getting money back
00:08:45.920 from the government from broaders and
00:08:48.160 rewarding people who are willing to
00:08:49.680 report what they see going on as the
00:08:52.959 1880s saying what you have to sometimes
00:08:55.519 set a rogue to catch a rogue and that's
00:08:57.600 important even if you had participated
00:08:59.480 in a fraud whether you're the very
00:09:00.880 innocent person who didn't even know
00:09:03.279 that if they added an 11 to the end of
00:09:05.240 their code that they were robbing the
00:09:07.200 government to somebody who told the Ross
00:09:10.120 hey you know what if I add an 11 you're
00:09:11.519 going to get more money but without
00:09:13.399 understanding that it was a a fraudulent
00:09:15.480 act it's it's always interesting to me
00:09:17.720 Benjamin Franklin is credited with a
00:09:19.279 quote that there something along the
00:09:21.240 lines of there's no evil into which good
00:09:24.320 men fall more easily than fraud on the
00:09:26.160 government right because there are
00:09:27.760 people who would never reach and take a
00:09:30.000 20 out of my pocket but if they got 20
00:09:32.839 from the government accidentally and
00:09:34.560 they didn't know why they'd just cash
00:09:36.000 that check right because the government
00:09:37.920 is kind of a all of us and none of us
00:09:40.720 you know not really a person we don't
00:09:42.800 really always feel that they're on our
00:09:44.720 side you know it's an interesting
00:09:47.240 situation because I see people who
00:09:49.279 really don't understand this is fraud
00:09:51.560 you know this is fraud just as if you
00:09:53.360 pull that 20 out of my purse and the
00:09:55.800 people who are troubled by what they're
00:09:57.519 experiencing and will bring that to the
00:09:58.959 government attention are my clients
00:10:00.760 they're absolutely fantastic a few
00:10:02.839 things came to my mind as you were
00:10:04.240 speaking one of which is of course the
00:10:06.360 risks from a whistleblowers standpoint
00:10:08.440 because we always hear about their
00:10:10.000 incentives and and things like that but
00:10:12.480 can you talk to us about the risks that
00:10:14.640 you know and maybe even some of the real
00:10:16.839 bad situations that have happened in the
00:10:18.440 past you know I tell my clients here's
00:10:20.720 the best case scenario that the case is
00:10:22.839 under seal the client starts looking for
00:10:25.120 another job they find another job before
00:10:27.440 the defendant knows that they're a
00:10:29.560 target of the government or at least
00:10:31.320 before they blame my client so they're
00:10:33.560 not there to blackball them but often
00:10:35.720 times what happens is that the client is
00:10:37.880 already at such loggerheads with the
00:10:39.480 defendant before they ever even get to
00:10:41.720 me a lot of times they've been fired
00:10:43.120 already and there is a provision under
00:10:45.440 the FCA for retaliation where in that
00:10:48.079 claim the claim for the government
00:10:49.959 belongs to the government and you don't
00:10:51.399 get to decide what they do with it the
00:10:54.120 claim for retaliation belongs to my
00:10:56.120 client we can pursue that independently
00:10:58.000 even if the government decides to go
00:10:59.760 after the defend the fraudulent or the
00:11:01.959 allegedly fraudulent conduct but yeah
00:11:04.480 the risk can be something to take
00:11:06.160 seriously you know frankly the reason
00:11:08.320 why we have the incentive the strong
00:11:09.959 incentives that we do for people to come
00:11:11.399 forward because it may just be money but
00:11:14.360 we're going to talk about the Cyber
00:11:15.880 fraud initiative here in a bit and we're
00:11:17.600 talking about State Secrets we're
00:11:19.480 talking about threat actors who are
00:11:21.160 interested in undermining our country
00:11:23.480 they're talking about National Security
00:11:25.399 and we can't have those people who know
00:11:27.519 that's going on afraid to come forward
00:11:29.680 that's why we had the whole system built
00:11:31.360 in to take care of them from heading
00:11:33.279 their attorney who's going to be paid by
00:11:34.720 the bad guy to making sure that they can
00:11:37.240 uh have their own cause of action if
00:11:38.800 they're retaliated against what I will
00:11:40.720 see happen often is a client who's been
00:11:43.079 terminated from their position that
00:11:45.200 they're reporting fraud on then having
00:11:47.600 trouble getting that next job because of
00:11:50.079 Whispers And innuendos that you can't
00:11:51.800 prove that's a really hard case to prove
00:11:53.959 I represented Dr David Felton in the
00:11:56.079 versus Bowmont so it's USHL Bowmont host
00:11:59.600 in Detroit and we wound up going all the
00:12:01.320 way to Supreme Court on the question of
00:12:03.519 whether a relator can be blackballed
00:12:07.560 whether blackballing is covered by the
00:12:09.839 retaliation statute and thankfully at
00:12:13.279 least in the at least in the six circuit
00:12:15.720 it's covered we do have a cause of
00:12:18.120 action if some if we can prove that
00:12:20.079 blackballing occurred we can get some
00:12:22.800 restitution for that you would think
00:12:24.279 that would be pretty straightforward it
00:12:25.839 was a long battle if been down to the
00:12:27.199 sixth circuit and then to the Supreme
00:12:28.480 Court but government's decision is it's
00:12:30.720 intervention decision so we file the
00:12:33.240 case as relators and The Government Can
00:12:35.240 intervene and take over the case when
00:12:37.320 they do that that means they're going to
00:12:38.680 be first chair lead attorney on the case
00:12:41.320 and I'll be second chair so we'll still
00:12:43.399 be helping but the government will be in
00:12:45.040 charg if that happens then the relator
00:12:47.360 share at the end of the day will be
00:12:48.720 between 15 and 25% 25% is reserved for
00:12:52.800 those situations where we go to trial
00:12:55.480 and the relayer has to testify maybe
00:12:58.199 they'd worn a wire at some point during
00:12:59.959 the investigation you know it's pretty
00:13:02.079 extreme examples I think the last time I
00:13:04.440 looked an average recovering an
00:13:06.519 intervene case somewhere between 17 18%
00:13:10.000 something like that but often defendants
00:13:11.839 would rather settle and have it
00:13:13.320 announced as a settlement rather than go
00:13:15.000 through a trial having all the evidence
00:13:16.760 trotted out about how naughty they've
00:13:18.199 been because the government is pretty
00:13:21.160 careful about going to trial and they
00:13:23.040 don't feel certain that they're going to
00:13:24.720 win now the other way it can go and this
00:13:26.720 is probably somewhere between 75 and8
00:13:29.120 85% of the time and that depends on who
00:13:31.279 you ask the government declines the case
00:13:33.519 and if they decline then you have the
00:13:34.760 choices for later you can continue to go
00:13:36.639 forward you can litigate it you can
00:13:39.279 continue to go forward and settle it it
00:13:41.600 is not a reflection the government
00:13:43.240 decision is and there's government
00:13:45.360 statements about this given in many
00:13:47.320 declined cases that go to trial few
00:13:49.199 cases go to trial fewer still are in
00:13:51.759 declin posture when they do but when
00:13:54.079 they do we've had some very as a relator
00:13:56.440 Spar we've had some very big successes
00:13:59.240 the government sometimes declines
00:14:00.880 because of risk sometimes declines
00:14:03.560 because of resources sometimes declines
00:14:05.800 because they've already sort of made
00:14:07.560 their statement about how this
00:14:09.000 particular area of law should work and
00:14:11.320 they they're diverting the resources
00:14:12.839 somewhere else can be policy
00:14:14.519 considerations there can be any number
00:14:17.000 of factors that claim to it what it
00:14:18.480 doesn't mean is that it's a bad case as
00:14:20.360 a relators council when the government
00:14:21.959 is making that decision you want to get
00:14:24.519 every bit of information you can on why
00:14:26.560 they're declining because obviously I
00:14:28.480 don't want to I only get paid if I win I
00:14:30.440 don't want to pursue a bad case if the
00:14:32.320 reason they're declining is it's a bad
00:14:33.800 case I'd rather be told know it early
00:14:36.040 and see if we need to just focus on
00:14:37.560 retaliation what what we need to do in
00:14:39.680 the best interest of our client where if
00:14:41.959 the government and and they sometimes do
00:14:44.000 say we're not going forward on this one
00:14:46.759 we think there's a case here but the
00:14:49.000 dollars you know we've got all the cases
00:14:51.040 to pick from and the amount of recovery
00:14:53.079 we're going to get from this one we
00:14:54.560 don't think will more the amount of
00:14:56.279 resources put into it but we would love
00:14:57.880 it if you go forward with this case then
00:14:59.839 we have to evaluate first of all our
00:15:01.720 client are you in for a long haul
00:15:03.560 litigation by now you've been doing this
00:15:05.240 for 3 to 5 years you know are you in it
00:15:07.639 for another three to five years with
00:15:09.759 risk and with your name out there in the
00:15:11.160 open and stud of under seal we have to
00:15:13.040 think about resources that we would put
00:15:14.759 into it as a firm but you know there are
00:15:17.120 also times where the government says
00:15:18.800 we've looked into this and the facts
00:15:21.240 just aren't there to support it I had
00:15:23.079 one case quite memorably where the the
00:15:25.279 relator was one of those biller coders
00:15:27.480 who had put in information
00:15:29.680 into the system and 100% I know it I
00:15:32.680 believe her that it was happening but
00:15:34.680 someone up the chain was fixing it so
00:15:37.199 when you got into looking at what
00:15:39.000 actually was built it was built properly
00:15:41.000 It's Kind of a Funny Story how all that
00:15:42.600 was happening but you know at that point
00:15:44.440 we just miss the case voluntarily while
00:15:46.639 it's still under seal the case may or
00:15:48.959 may not be unsealed after that you have
00:15:50.560 to be prepared as a false claims act
00:15:52.480 plet that you likely as a relator that
00:15:54.720 is that you probably will have your name
00:15:57.399 somewhere in the court files at some
00:15:58.759 point point so but there's obviously a
00:16:00.959 big difference between having your case
00:16:03.279 written up about in The New York Times
00:16:05.639 versus having your case quietly come out
00:16:08.120 from under seal in a dismissed posture
00:16:09.759 because nobody cares so it's not doesn't
00:16:11.880 hit the internet so speak well that's
00:16:13.800 really fascinating and and also bring up
00:16:16.040 another point I was thinking about the
00:16:18.519 numbers right of complaints that might
00:16:21.000 be under seal is there any government
00:16:23.560 resource that we can look at to see for
00:16:26.639 example like do they have stats on this
00:16:29.000 available or anything like that every
00:16:31.399 year the government reports on how much
00:16:34.440 it recovered through the FCA how much of
00:16:36.560 that was brought by relators and it
00:16:37.920 breaks it down by industry it's pretty
00:16:39.920 interesting to look at how much is quum
00:16:43.000 versus not quum in the different
00:16:44.720 Industries and different years it's very
00:16:47.360 interesting well that's a great segue
00:16:49.399 into the doj's Civil cyber fraud
00:16:52.319 initiative talk to us about that and
00:16:54.399 what that is it's fun to say right you
00:16:57.399 on the tongue we call it the CCF by
00:16:59.480 civil cyber fraud initiative so if you
00:17:01.519 break that down civil as opposed to
00:17:03.440 criminal right the Department of Justice
00:17:05.520 is divided into two sides of the house
00:17:07.720 the criminal side and the Civil side and
00:17:09.640 it's important to note that because I've
00:17:11.559 noticed in the LinkedIn conversations
00:17:13.400 now that the Cyber people are taking a
00:17:15.039 look at the FCA world that there's some
00:17:18.000 confusion over that like this is not a
00:17:19.799 throw you in jail part of the statute
00:17:22.559 although there are criminal penalties
00:17:24.199 that can be associated with the FCA this
00:17:26.280 is the Civil cyber fraud initiative
00:17:28.000 cyber fraud you know about than I do and
00:17:30.160 the initiative means the Department of
00:17:32.000 Justice is really interested in this
00:17:33.480 right now it tells us as relators
00:17:35.320 Council be on the lookout right that
00:17:37.200 below this is the kind of case we want
00:17:38.880 to see and they were very candid when
00:17:41.160 they announced it I think it's October
00:17:42.679 2020 they basically said look we know
00:17:45.240 that people are not taking their cyber
00:17:46.799 obligation seriously against that
00:17:48.760 background let's say that you know we
00:17:50.160 have cmmc being developed but we're not
00:17:52.640 there yet since January 2018
00:17:54.640 particularly if you're a best contractor
00:17:56.520 you've been under an obligation through
00:17:58.120 the Federal acquisition regulations the
00:18:00.000 defense Federal acquisition regulations
00:18:01.760 the fars and defs we love our acronyms
00:18:04.159 and government have obligated you to
00:18:06.120 follow the N standards and if they're
00:18:08.320 ingesting or creating cui then they need
00:18:11.440 to be in compliance with these standards
00:18:13.760 and what the Civil cyber front
00:18:15.640 initiative comes along about two and a
00:18:17.440 half years later and says we don't think
00:18:19.240 you're doing it right all this self
00:18:21.320 attestation we're not so sure that
00:18:23.360 you're really doing it and we're going
00:18:24.720 to incentivize people to report which is
00:18:26.960 a great thing because as as that has
00:18:29.240 opened up I have heard from so many
00:18:32.679 people who are in such Straits feeling
00:18:35.679 concerned that they know that you know
00:18:37.440 State secrets are not protected that our
00:18:39.440 intellectual property is out in the
00:18:41.200 clear and that there's no appropriate
00:18:43.480 defense being placed around it and
00:18:45.520 they've raised it internally and they've
00:18:47.400 fought battles internally and they're
00:18:49.200 just not able to get it a proper amount
00:18:51.120 of tension and funding put on it to get
00:18:52.720 it fixed behold the Civil cyber fraud
00:18:54.840 initiative and that gives you a chance
00:18:56.600 to come to a relator Council and let the
00:19:00.559 government know what's going on when
00:19:03.240 they announced the initiative they did
00:19:05.159 it what I call three flavors of cyber
00:19:07.280 fraud initiative cases and the these are
00:19:09.520 not exclusive but these are the kind of
00:19:11.120 things that we're looking for so the
00:19:13.039 first would be knowing failure to comply
00:19:15.760 with cyber security regulations or
00:19:18.039 standards and you're not in compliance
00:19:20.159 and the government is saying bring us
00:19:21.520 those cases and remind me to tell you
00:19:23.679 about materiality in a minute because
00:19:25.480 that's where the Civil cyber fraud
00:19:26.960 initiative kind of stepped in but we got
00:19:29.400 knowing failure to comply with cyber
00:19:31.679 security standards knowing
00:19:34.159 misrepresentation of security controls
00:19:36.480 and practices so there's where you're
00:19:38.320 putting in uh I think our Spurs score is
00:19:42.120 102 and maybe it's not maybe it's
00:19:45.000 actually ne4 maybe it's 75 it's not
00:19:47.720 quite that bad but when you knowingly
00:19:49.559 input your Spur score um wrong you're
00:19:52.039 making a false representation to the
00:19:54.120 federal government about your cyber
00:19:56.880 security practices and control
00:19:59.400 and that's going to fall under the
00:20:01.480 federal F claims act and I have a
00:20:02.960 question about that because there are a
00:20:04.440 lot of companies who maybe just they
00:20:07.960 think they did a good job and they
00:20:09.679 submit a score that's inaccurate is that
00:20:11.919 what this is focused on or is it the
00:20:14.240 people who like we just we don't care
00:20:16.880 we're just submitting at 110 you know
00:20:18.640 whatever so it's a great question and
00:20:20.799 the answer is somewhere in between this
00:20:22.840 is a fraud statute it's a fraud waste
00:20:24.640 and abuse the word knowingly is there
00:20:26.600 right knowing this representation so
00:20:28.960 let's take one instance where you in
00:20:33.039 2018 2019 you put in your story score
00:20:36.880 and you had Bob the IT guy review your
00:20:39.960 system and he looked at it and said
00:20:42.640 looks good to me and th was born your
00:20:45.799 your Spur score you put it in a system
00:20:48.600 and you move on down the road well
00:20:50.320 sometime between then and 2024 you ought
00:20:53.120 to have become aware of the fact that
00:20:54.960 this is a pretty specialized area this
00:20:56.840 is not something that necessarily every
00:20:59.400 I is going to understand the meaning of
00:21:01.919 the N controls and there's many many
00:21:05.039 opportunities for educating yourself
00:21:06.760 your company and somewhere along the
00:21:09.480 line most companies by this point have
00:21:11.440 brought in an actual cyber security
00:21:13.360 person right so enter cyber security Bob
00:21:17.279 and he looks and goes holy moly kid
00:21:19.039 that's not at all as high as you thought
00:21:20.799 it was that's not what this means you
00:21:23.320 know helps them understand and audit
00:21:25.279 their own system and when that happens
00:21:27.640 it's now knowing now you know that it's
00:21:30.279 not what you thought it was so you've
00:21:32.360 got some choices there you can go in and
00:21:34.320 change it which is what I think is
00:21:36.159 probably you ought to do is update that
00:21:39.120 score and put in your plan of action and
00:21:42.159 correction and poem I I know it's a poem
00:21:45.080 and I I get all the little words mixed
00:21:46.720 up but you put your poem in and that's
00:21:49.679 how you let the government know we're on
00:21:51.039 it and that's the open and honest way to
00:21:53.320 communicate right as opposed to hey we
00:21:55.919 don't have to certify again for another
00:21:57.440 three years so let's score that's out
00:21:59.960 there as a knowing misrepresentation and
00:22:01.840 let's just try to fix it before the
00:22:03.240 three years are up and then what I'm
00:22:04.960 seeing and a lot of what I'm hearing
00:22:06.640 from relators and potential relators is
00:22:09.440 the business in operations in says yeah
00:22:11.520 we'll deal with that before the next
00:22:13.480 certification period and then they don't
00:22:15.520 put the resources on it and that sort of
00:22:17.840 three years vanishes in a Flash like it
00:22:19.640 does in my life and now you've got
00:22:22.080 recertify now you're not where you said
00:22:24.720 you are and you're doing another
00:22:26.279 certification so I guess the law answer
00:22:29.320 is the word knowingly can mean actual
00:22:32.080 knowledge I I knew that it was wrong and
00:22:34.559 I did it anyway it can also mean all the
00:22:37.640 way over to Reckless disregard or
00:22:39.480 deliberate ignorance so you can't put
00:22:42.200 your fingers in your ears your head in
00:22:43.799 the sand N I hear nothing I know nothing
00:22:47.080 and consider that well I didn't know
00:22:49.559 yeah that's very interesting I'm just
00:22:51.000 thinking about a scenario where you have
00:22:52.559 Bob the IT guy right and he doesn't know
00:22:55.000 nist and he's saying I need training on
00:22:57.840 this and you just say nah just do it do
00:23:01.279 the best you yeah that's that's
00:23:03.600 definitely a trouble area talk to us
00:23:05.559 about an external provider like an MSP
00:23:09.000 because I think a lot of small
00:23:10.840 businesses rely on msps is there a
00:23:13.240 difference between relying on an
00:23:14.960 internal employee or relying on an
00:23:17.400 external entity like a MSP to give you
00:23:21.200 your cyber security compliance yes there
00:23:23.799 is a difference there's a big difference
00:23:25.919 in the employee situation you're
00:23:27.440 controlling as noted his training his
00:23:30.039 access his funding his job duties you
00:23:33.240 know this is not the kind of scheme for
00:23:35.840 a big campus where Bob the IT guy is
00:23:39.120 going to be able to run the campus do
00:23:41.039 all the updates that are required do the
00:23:42.919 cyber security manage the nist
00:23:45.440 obligation you know you're going to need
00:23:47.200 more people than that it depending on
00:23:49.240 the size of the campus obviously but if
00:23:51.240 you can contract that out then someone
00:23:53.880 else is legally on the hook for taking
00:23:55.600 care of it now they may be subject to
00:23:58.559 assume because they're not doing what
00:24:00.080 they're promising their customers often
00:24:02.360 their customers could even include the
00:24:03.799 federal government right so it's a
00:24:06.159 really good and nuanced question there
00:24:09.080 is a provision under the false claims
00:24:11.120 act it's actually to submit a false
00:24:13.919 claim or caus to be submitted a false
00:24:16.240 claim so if I'm the doctor lying on the
00:24:19.960 billing but I myself never submit a
00:24:22.480 claim to the government then the people
00:24:25.360 that are actually submitting it are not
00:24:27.720 necessarily trouble if all their job is
00:24:29.760 to put in what you hand me and hit go to
00:24:32.039 the government they're not on the hook
00:24:34.480 for submitting a false claim because
00:24:35.840 they didn't know it was a false claim
00:24:37.840 but the doctor is because he caused them
00:24:40.120 to submit the false claim so it' be kind
00:24:42.399 of the same thing if you had a contract
00:24:44.120 for someone to provide your cyber
00:24:45.760 security and they weren't doing what
00:24:47.360 they said they were doing then you have
00:24:49.120 a knowing cause to be submitted false
00:24:52.039 information coming from the contracted
00:24:53.799 company but if it's Bob your it guy
00:24:56.440 you're the one in control of Bob and if
00:24:58.640 Bob's not doing his job presumably you
00:25:00.320 need to replace him with Tom the IT guy
00:25:02.640 or Susie the it gal and and get that
00:25:05.760 addressed right but on the other hand if
00:25:08.360 you are Contracting to an MSP but
00:25:10.880 they're not necessarily responsible for
00:25:13.799 providing your n compliance Services
00:25:15.480 getting you that high sprs score but
00:25:17.880 you're just relying on them because you
00:25:19.600 don't want to look into it then you
00:25:21.240 could be liable is that right if I
00:25:23.320 understood the question yes so if you're
00:25:26.480 not paying attention to what you're
00:25:27.840 buying or you are over relying on the
00:25:31.000 services being provided without looking
00:25:33.000 into what they're promising that they do
00:25:35.559 then yes you could be on the hook for
00:25:37.520 that you can't just say well I I use
00:25:40.320 Microsoft I'm good that's that's not
00:25:42.799 okay gotcha gotta you have to be
00:25:44.799 responsible for it you can delegate it
00:25:46.760 you can pay someone to do it just like
00:25:48.240 you can pay Bob to do it but you're
00:25:49.640 responsible for it yes yes makes sense
00:25:52.399 now we just talked about knowing
00:25:53.799 misrepresentation of security controls
00:25:55.679 and practices there's a third one talk
00:25:57.919 to us about that yeah that is the
00:25:59.840 knowing failure to report suspected
00:26:01.919 cyber incidents that's the one that I
00:26:03.919 think everybody jumps to and I think the
00:26:05.960 reason people jump to that is because it
00:26:07.720 seems like if there's not been an
00:26:10.279 incident or a breach I call it a breach
00:26:12.720 because I'm a plainist lawyer but is if
00:26:14.840 there's not been one then what's the
00:26:16.919 damage right and and that I think
00:26:20.440 underlines why there's a civil cyber
00:26:22.080 fraud initiative we need to know about
00:26:24.440 it before there's a breach we want
00:26:25.960 people to correct it we want to
00:26:27.360 incentivize people to correct these gaps
00:26:29.720 in cyber security before the the horse
00:26:33.200 is out the barn door and so this is if
00:26:36.440 your horse has gone through the Barn
00:26:37.960 Door you need to report it to the
00:26:39.679 government but you know for all kinds of
00:26:41.080 reasons they need to know so that they
00:26:42.840 can keep up with who the threat actors
00:26:45.320 are what kind of schemes are being used
00:26:48.039 there's a limited amount the FBI can do
00:26:50.240 when it doesn't have data right and so
00:26:53.039 getting that data in the hands of the
00:26:54.480 FBI is critical at the same time if you
00:26:57.960 know my intellectual property has been
00:26:59.679 stolen I'd kind of like to know that you
00:27:02.000 know I mean it's it's a little bit like
00:27:03.960 confessing to your parents you know yes
00:27:06.120 that was my hand in a cookie jar but
00:27:08.240 it's just going to get worse if you
00:27:09.720 don't report it right and so I have not
00:27:13.279 personally brought yet a um cyber
00:27:15.679 incident case and it's not to say I
00:27:18.440 wouldn't one of the questions that I
00:27:20.480 have about it is remember always knowing
00:27:23.080 failure to report suspected incidents so
00:27:26.760 when does it let it rise to the of
00:27:28.559 suspected how much do you have to
00:27:30.320 believe it's likely what kind of
00:27:32.120 incident are we talking about I mean
00:27:33.399 those are some very squishy terms and so
00:27:37.080 I find it much less squishy to say you
00:27:39.360 misrepresented your controls than I do
00:27:42.000 to say you should have reported this
00:27:44.200 suspected incident that doesn't mean I
00:27:46.200 won't take that case with the right Kate
00:27:48.120 because you know the squishy part's in
00:27:49.960 the middle there's cases where you
00:27:51.600 clearly should have reported there are
00:27:53.159 cases where I cannot imagine that
00:27:54.799 anybody would be upset you didn't report
00:27:56.960 but then there's a lot of territory in
00:27:58.760 between those two interesting you
00:28:00.760 mentioned materiality before yeah I was
00:28:03.840 just thinking that that really goes to
00:28:05.279 materiality and I usually say that when
00:28:07.240 I say why there is a civil cyber fraud
00:28:09.159 initiative if you had come to me as Bob
00:28:12.080 bit guy you know in 2020 even 20
00:28:15.919 certainly 2018 and said my company
00:28:19.399 signed on the dotted line and put this
00:28:21.519 number in their Spur score and they are
00:28:24.960 not compliant with my I would have been
00:28:27.600 very hent to bring that case because one
00:28:30.200 of the things that you have to prove
00:28:31.840 under false claims act scenario is that
00:28:35.240 okay they knew they were lying they lied
00:28:37.720 and that the LIE mattered and that's
00:28:39.840 what materiality is but it could be that
00:28:43.159 you know the contract says you're going
00:28:45.640 to build them from the ground up you'll
00:28:47.760 have all the subcontractors under you
00:28:49.480 doing everything and by the way you're
00:28:51.679 only going to use americanmade products
00:28:54.640 okay or you're going to pay a certain uh
00:28:57.159 level of wage
00:28:58.640 because this is a federal contract so
00:29:00.440 the level of wage case is a Davis bacon
00:29:02.799 act case Davis bacon act says how much
00:29:04.840 you got to pay your hourly workers and
00:29:06.760 it's a very you think it would be easy
00:29:08.320 but it's a very complicated table that
00:29:09.919 changes a lot and depends on whether
00:29:12.159 you're classified as you know a master
00:29:13.640 electrician or different levels same
00:29:16.799 with use only American products that all
00:29:19.679 of those are real cases and we brought
00:29:21.440 them but they're very tricky because the
00:29:24.760 government contracted for buildings if
00:29:27.640 they had known that you really were not
00:29:29.720 paying Davis bacon wages would they have
00:29:31.679 given you the contract and the answer is
00:29:34.039 well hm how do we quantify the damage
00:29:37.159 for that you know obviously they wanted
00:29:39.919 they didn't just want a building built
00:29:41.840 because they spend for policy reasons so
00:29:44.840 they wanted buildings built and they
00:29:46.120 wanted those wages to go out to the
00:29:47.600 right people and they wanted you to
00:29:49.200 support our domestic industry by buying
00:29:51.559 American products and when you don't do
00:29:53.600 some of that then you have to start
00:29:55.240 asking a question well okay did they run
00:29:58.320 to the hardware store because they were
00:29:59.760 out of nails and bought some nails at
00:30:02.279 Home Depot that turns out were from
00:30:04.279 China so one box of nails is probably
00:30:07.399 not Material right if you sourced all
00:30:10.159 your steel from someplace where you
00:30:12.399 shouldn't be sourcing steel that's a
00:30:14.440 different level of problem we're still
00:30:16.960 going to have to figure out the damages
00:30:19.240 and there's a lot of ways that we look
00:30:20.440 at damages under procurement contracts
00:30:23.120 and you know frankly these cases have
00:30:25.519 not yet made it through the cycle far
00:30:27.640 enough to have that answered by a court
00:30:30.039 you're going to have arguments on all
00:30:31.519 sides and a courts typically look at how
00:30:33.519 much the utility of the thing you did
00:30:35.679 contract for was affected and you know I
00:30:37.840 would say and I'm your later Council
00:30:39.799 like if I'm paying you to develop
00:30:41.480 intellectual property for me and you're
00:30:43.720 making it available to the wide world
00:30:45.559 because you won't put up your proper
00:30:46.880 cyber controls I'm not getting any value
00:30:49.279 for my money right another suggestion
00:30:51.840 I'm made in these cases we don't know
00:30:53.640 where it's going to go yet but what
00:30:55.159 about remediation if you are on a call
00:30:58.039 you Mega company and you've got Deep
00:31:00.840 Pockets and you've been doing everything
00:31:02.919 wrong because you don't want to spend
00:31:04.080 money you want to have profits and you
00:31:06.720 have not complied with nist and let's
00:31:10.279 say there's not even been an incident
00:31:11.760 yet you know what you've avoided paying
00:31:14.639 to come up to speed might be the measure
00:31:16.760 of the damages this is just duy talking
00:31:19.159 so this is not the government or case
00:31:21.399 law but that's one way to quantify what
00:31:23.960 you took away from us I think it's an
00:31:25.679 important Point too the government wants
00:31:27.639 to
00:31:28.519 make sure that companies who do the
00:31:30.120 right thing are not penalized if you
00:31:32.039 have three companies and two of them are
00:31:33.919 doing the spend they need to do to make
00:31:36.120 sure they're cyber compliant and Company
00:31:38.039 C does not it's at a you know
00:31:40.039 competitive advantage in not having to
00:31:41.799 spend that money and still getting all
00:31:43.600 the same benefits that's sort of a
00:31:45.399 restitution kind of model a remediation
00:31:47.440 model but of course what you would do
00:31:50.120 remember it's a treble damages statute
00:31:52.120 is you would say it's going to cost you
00:31:53.919 a million dollars just to use Easy Math
00:31:56.159 because lawyers are bad at math uh a
00:31:58.039 million dollar to to get compliant and
00:32:00.679 you're going to pay the US $2 million in
00:32:03.639 bandages under the faal claims act and
00:32:05.360 we want you to take that other million
00:32:06.799 and fix it right that's another way to
00:32:09.159 to maybe think about it I don't know
00:32:10.919 what courts will say I'm not sure what
00:32:12.679 position the US will take it's going to
00:32:15.080 be a lot more nuanced like if you are a
00:32:17.440 company whose sole reason for existence
00:32:20.240 is cyber security and you're not doing
00:32:22.480 it it's pretty darn material to the
00:32:24.360 contract you know it's it's hard to
00:32:26.720 argue that it's not even in the pre-
00:32:28.919 Cyber fraud initiative days if you are a
00:32:31.480 company who builds buildings and you're
00:32:33.960 not compliant you never actually
00:32:36.360 ingested cui but you had that type of
00:32:40.000 contract for whatever reason maybe that
00:32:42.480 factually that's not going to been
00:32:43.880 looked at the same way for damages
00:32:45.679 purposes maybe but there's so many
00:32:48.440 factors that'll go into that decision
00:32:49.960 it's really impossible to say right now
00:32:51.799 now there's been a few different
00:32:53.799 complaints that have been unsealed
00:32:56.039 recently and higher education and one of
00:32:58.799 those you're involved with directly the
00:33:01.080 Georgia Tech false claims act complaint
00:33:04.039 can you talk to us about that and
00:33:05.880 summarize what that's about I sure can
00:33:08.200 now I'll just say there's there are two
00:33:10.320 out from under seal so what we've had so
00:33:12.679 far we had the AET rocket n case that
00:33:15.039 settled a 9 million two days into trial
00:33:18.159 and the government did not intervene in
00:33:19.720 that case it was filed in 2018 before
00:33:21.960 the Civil cyber fraud initiative it
00:33:23.840 settled in 2021 I believe after the
00:33:26.519 initiative had been announced and the US
00:33:28.440 did kind of come in and settle that
00:33:30.399 after the trial had already begun so we
00:33:33.240 don't really know how the damages were
00:33:34.600 reached kind of opaque that was the
00:33:36.960 first and they they call that the first
00:33:38.679 even though it wasn't brought under the
00:33:40.240 initiative then we've had I think the
00:33:43.360 Community Health Services which was two
00:33:46.559 different relators bringing two cases
00:33:48.799 that were Consolidated that the US
00:33:50.320 settled and then we've had the jellybean
00:33:52.200 case which was a case of like Children's
00:33:55.000 Health I believe and they were not
00:33:56.399 taking proper care of information you
00:33:58.399 know hippo violation type case we had
00:34:00.760 Verizon who
00:34:02.159 self-disclosed that they had an issue
00:34:04.600 and they did get cooperation credit for
00:34:06.760 that you only pay double damages if you
00:34:08.480 self report there's a big incentive
00:34:10.639 there to self report so Verizon has
00:34:13.320 settled and is considered under the act
00:34:15.199 the two sort of pending out there in the
00:34:17.199 clear are both mind and they're both
00:34:19.239 coincidentally although this is not the
00:34:20.839 only kind of case that brought they are
00:34:22.639 both as you said public research
00:34:24.079 institutions and there's a whole other
00:34:25.800 set of policy considerations in play
00:34:28.239 when you're talking about public
00:34:29.839 universities and and you know research
00:34:32.040 centers that are centered there the one
00:34:34.280 that you referenced is the Georgia Tech
00:34:36.918 case which is here in my own Atlanta
00:34:39.079 actually my husband is a Georgia Tech
00:34:40.719 graduate spent many many many times in
00:34:43.239 the rich building there for Georgia
00:34:44.520 State so it was brought in July of 2022
00:34:49.960 and it's it's two folks who were inside
00:34:53.000 Georgia Tech obviously relators and the
00:34:55.560 allegations are it's unsealed can see
00:34:57.960 the complaint that kind of exactly what
00:34:59.720 I just described as being a very common
00:35:01.599 fact pattern there was a problem in one
00:35:03.880 lab they went in to look at that lab and
00:35:06.760 realized what they had suspected which
00:35:08.680 is the campus was not consistently
00:35:10.960 following the standards research
00:35:12.640 institutions often have how do you scope
00:35:14.839 out that campus right is it for each lab
00:35:17.960 is it for the whole campus and because
00:35:20.240 if you're a company you know your campus
00:35:22.560 when you have different principal
00:35:24.119 investigators who've always operated
00:35:26.000 kind of independently need a governing
00:35:28.800 organization to make sure that they're
00:35:30.560 all complying with the N allegations
00:35:32.680 whereas you know I think that sort of
00:35:34.520 vulcanization of campuses I don't know
00:35:37.040 what you have when you have that kind of
00:35:38.280 amalgamation of people and different
00:35:40.680 people signing the attestations and then
00:35:43.680 the ones who are setting the systems up
00:35:45.480 so it really puts you in a precarious
00:35:48.480 position so those relators did their
00:35:50.560 best to try to fix it internally we're
00:35:52.079 not able to do that thankfully they they
00:35:54.319 found our firm they found me and we
00:35:56.240 drafted that complaint and as part of
00:35:58.160 that I started to really understand the
00:35:59.680 N standards which I'd never had to delve
00:36:01.440 into before so I turned that into a blog
00:36:03.480 post and said hey this is a thing now
00:36:06.240 civil cyber fraud initiative and once I
00:36:08.880 got that blog post posted that's how
00:36:11.319 Matt Decker found me who's the relator
00:36:13.440 in De versus P state so Matt's case was
00:36:16.119 filed in October of 2022 so between July
00:36:19.640 and October both of those cases were
00:36:21.599 filed and then because judges are fickle
00:36:24.000 Beast Matt's case actually was unsealed
00:36:26.040 before the Georgia Tech matter they had
00:36:28.359 not even a year before the judge decided
00:36:30.880 no more extensions you need to decide if
00:36:33.400 you're intervening or not and that's not
00:36:35.319 a trivial decision especially in a new
00:36:37.720 area of law like the Civil cyber fraud
00:36:40.119 initiative we're trying to create a new
00:36:42.400 area of law where we're trying to
00:36:44.720 resolve things like I just talked to
00:36:46.079 about damages like we don't know how any
00:36:47.560 of that works yet so we're doing a lot
00:36:49.760 of first level looking at how this will
00:36:52.520 go live in the field and they were not
00:36:54.520 prepared to make a decision so they
00:36:56.119 filed what we call a demi declination
00:36:58.359 which is they say you told us we have to
00:37:00.000 decide but we can't decide yet and so
00:37:01.920 that's not a declination but the court
00:37:03.839 won't let them just sit there so the
00:37:05.560 court says well if you didn't intervene
00:37:07.599 then you declined and what we all agreed
00:37:09.680 to do was to accept magistrate
00:37:12.200 jurisdiction and ask the magistrate for
00:37:14.400 State for the purpose of allowing the
00:37:16.480 United States to finish this
00:37:17.560 investigation so that's where we are
00:37:19.280 that 180 day state and Decker will run
00:37:21.960 out I think early May and then we may be
00:37:24.839 asking for another extension of the stay
00:37:27.240 they may may be making an intervention
00:37:28.640 decision it could go either way those
00:37:30.480 are just the options that are available
00:37:32.079 we don't know yet what's going to happen
00:37:33.280 in Decker just a few weeks ago at the
00:37:35.200 end of February the Georgia Tech case
00:37:38.000 which had been around for what three
00:37:39.319 months longer but remained under seal
00:37:41.599 this entire time the U did intervene in
00:37:44.119 they have four months to draft what's
00:37:45.839 called their complaint in Intervention
00:37:48.040 which is taking my complaint and saying
00:37:50.000 what pieces are going forward I for
00:37:52.240 example named as a descendant the
00:37:54.560 Georgia Tech research Corporation GTR
00:37:58.240 gtrc and GT are not public entities in
00:38:01.440 the way that the Georgia Institute of
00:38:03.319 Technology is I also named Georgia
00:38:05.280 Institute of Technology so they're going
00:38:07.079 to decide who they're going forward
00:38:08.400 against they could drop a defendant they
00:38:10.040 could add more defendants they're going
00:38:11.480 to decide which claims they're going
00:38:12.800 forward on you know I said the whole
00:38:14.480 campus is defective or I'm using the
00:38:16.520 word campus wrong there I guess in the
00:38:18.880 in the college sense I said this whole
00:38:21.720 place is messed up they could do some
00:38:24.000 smaller version of that and again those
00:38:25.880 are just options that are on the table
00:38:27.599 but we'll see when their complaint and
00:38:28.880 intervention comes out exactly what
00:38:30.599 they're targeting and going forward with
00:38:32.640 very interesting so doj involvement in
00:38:35.280 the Georgia Tech matter and then when
00:38:38.040 Penn State it's a they're deciding
00:38:40.720 essentially they're deciding they're
00:38:41.960 still on the deciding process okay and I
00:38:43.640 saw Linked In A lot of people who are
00:38:45.079 kind of confused about that there has
00:38:46.880 been no statement from the government
00:38:49.359 yes or no on all they've said is we
00:38:51.480 don't know yet that's all that's
00:38:52.920 happened in Penn State and the only
00:38:54.240 reason that they're saying that in the
00:38:55.480 clear and not under seal is because that
00:38:57.880 particular judge in the eastern district
00:38:59.480 of Pennsylvania decided it was enough
00:39:02.280 seal enough seal for you you out from M
00:39:05.200 seal you though so we're now in the
00:39:06.680 Magistrate Court doing what would
00:39:08.000 normally be happening under seal in the
00:39:10.480 district court okay wow well that gives
00:39:13.520 everybody a bit of the inside scoop then
00:39:15.359 that's very fascinating wow I want to
00:39:17.680 thank you so much for coming on this has
00:39:19.200 been really really interesting and I
00:39:21.000 think a lot of people will learn from
00:39:22.599 this so thank you so much where can
00:39:24.800 people find you I'm at fault claims you
00:39:27.680 know fcac council.com so it's
00:39:30.920 www.fca.com I'm Julie bracker on
00:39:33.599 leakedin I would love to chat with
00:39:35.160 anybody if have questions about this
00:39:36.480 this is super interesting to me and I'm
00:39:38.200 really enjoying getting to know the
00:39:40.200 community here is very interesting like
00:39:41.920 I said I've been a plus one to so many
00:39:43.560 of these events it's really fun to kind
00:39:45.240 of get to know people you know on this
00:39:46.800 level and especially when people have
00:39:48.200 concerns and questions about who are you
00:39:50.079 going after and I can't tell you what
00:39:51.720 the department is going to do but I can
00:39:53.200 tell you as relators Council what we're
00:39:54.839 looking at what I'm looking for or where
00:39:56.520 people should know better by now so I'm
00:39:58.359 not buying be like gosh I didn't know
00:40:00.720 that's not a thing anymore it's too
00:40:02.839 impossible to be in this world in this
00:40:05.079 field and not know that you have cyber
00:40:06.760 obligations to the government right
00:40:08.160 people who know what they should be
00:40:09.560 doing and they're not doing it they just
00:40:11.079 refuse to hear it they're not trying to
00:40:13.599 make it better or they're trying to make
00:40:15.520 it better and cover up while they make
00:40:17.480 it better if you're doing that you
00:40:18.800 should be worried if you're not doing
00:40:20.560 that you should not be so worried this
00:40:22.400 is not the end of days this is like
00:40:24.319 always we don't want people defrauding
00:40:26.000 the deun not really a chance change
00:40:27.720 other than that we're bringing it to the
00:40:29.200 Cyber realm and saying that's material
00:40:31.319 to us too cyber security is now a
00:40:33.960 material part of your contract with the
00:40:35.319 government yes well excellent excellent
00:40:38.480 thank you so much for sharing your
00:40:39.599 knowledge today really appreciate it so
00:40:42.240 fun thanks for having me I appreciate
00:40:45.770 [Music]
00:40:53.680 it